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Comments on JudgeJohnson's Article
LESLIE HAROLD LEVINSON*

Judge Johnson defines civil disobedience as open violation of the law
by a person who willingly accepts the punishment. Conceding that such
conduct may on occasions be morally proper, Judge Johnson maintains it
can never be legally justified. "[T]he law," he states, "can make no provision for its violation except to hold the offender liable for punishment....
[T]he right to break the law cannot be officially recognized."'
There are many situations where a person openly and deliberately violates the law, and willingly exposes himself to the possibility of punishment,
while hoping that he will eventually not be subjected to punishment.
He may hope that the legal system, in the course of looking into his
violation, will change the governing norm so that his conduct, which violated
"the law" as it seemed to be at the time, is found to be within "the law" as it
turns out to be when his case is disposed of. For example, he may disobey a
statute because he alleges it is unconstitutional, or he may disobey an administrative order because he alleges it is ultra vires. 2 Or, without directly
challenging the legality of "the law," he may hope that the law is so
drastically out of tune with the community's sense of values that the prosecutor will not prosecute, or the jury will not find him guilty, or the judge
will not sentence him.
Or the disobedient may hope that his conduct, either alone or in concert with others, will so effectively dramatize his position as to bring about
sweeping social reforms, coupled with some form of amnesty or pardon by
*B.B.A. 1957, LL.B. 1962, University of Miami; LL.M. 1964, New York University; Member of Florida and New York Bars; Certified Public Accountant; Associate Professor of Law,
University of Florida; Faculty Advisor, University of Florida Law Review.
1. Johnson, Civil Disobedience and the Law, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 275, 276 (1968). The authors of some recent articles share Judge Johnson's view that the actor's willingness to accept
punishment is an essential element in the definition of civil disobedience, e.g., Allen, Civil
Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 5-11 (1967); De Boisblanc, The
Dilemma of the Disobedient: a Solution, 42 IND. L.J. 521, 524 (1967). Others omit this
element from the definition, e.g., Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEXAS L.
REv. 507, 508 (1965); McKay, Protest and Dissent: Action and Reaction, 1966 UTAH L. REV.
20, 25. For reasons which will become apparent in this comment, the present writer prefers to view civil disobedience as open violation of the law (for appropriate purposes) by
a person who willingly exposes himself to the possibility of punishment.
2. Judge Johnson illustrates these points by citing Keegan and Okamoto (both implying legal justification for violating a statute where the violator in good faith alleges it
is unconstitutional and the court agrees), and by citing the Tax Court procedure (granting
legal justification for refusing to pay taxes assessed by an administrative determination,
pending the Tax Court's decision on the legality of the assessment). While the general
rule is that a person cannot be punished for disobeying an unlawful administrative order,
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963), special exceptions have sometimes placed limits
on the time and manner in which the validity of the order may successfully be challenged.
E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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which his conduct, admittedly unlawful, will be excused in the interests of
future harmony in the community.3
In the situations suggested above, a person who commits an open violation
may reasonably anticipate that society will, officially or unofficially, grant him
the privilege of breaking the law with impunity. 4
Under the classic Thoreau-Gandhi-King formulation the disobedient
anticipates no relief in the form of legal justification or pardon. He then
willingly accepts not simply exposure to the possibility of punishment but
the virtual certainty that punishment will in fact be inflicted.
In asserting that such violators must be punished, Judge Johnson does
not completely dispose of the problem. For the legal system must determine
the form and severity of the punishment, and the law often provides extremely
broad leeway in these matters. And, in addition to punishing the violator,
society must determine whether steps should be taken to remedy the underlying situation which provoked his disobedient act.
In many areas of criminal law it is customary to base the punishment
not only upon the nature of the overt act but also upon the purpose of the
actor; the more morally reprehensible the actor's purpose, the more severe
his punishment. 5 A similar approach might be useful in determining the
punishment of a person who violates the law by committing an act of civil
disobedience; a violator who can demonstrate a morally acceptable purpose
should be punished less severely than one who cannot.
The purpose of classic civil disobedience is to protest an issue dramatically
so as to arouse the public conscience. In order to measure the moral acceptability of the act, it is relevant to inquire whether any more socially acceptable means of protest were available and seemed reasonably likely to
succeed. As Judge Johnson points out in a slightly different context, society
may look for some sense of proportion between the dimensions of the protest
and of the problem against which the protest is directed.8
Sometimes the issue being protested is immediately and inseparably linked
to the law being violated, and in this type of situation the community can
most readily understand and evaluate the purpose of the violation. However, only a small proportion of our legal system consists of laws susceptible

3. The granting of the Magna Charta and, later, of the Petition of Right, illustrates
the point. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 269 n.6.
4. Another possibility may be worth brief mention. A person may participate in acts
of civil disobedience in concert with a large number of other persons. Because of their
large numbers, all may stand a fair chance of escaping the police dragnet and thereby
becoming immune from punishment. Each participant exposes himself to a "sporting
chance" of being punished, and his violation is "open" in the sense that the police have

a "sporting chance" of catching him.
5. The matter is often discussed under the heading "motive." G. WUMLAMs, CREMINAL
LAw: THn GENERAL PART §21 (2d ed. 1961); Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the
Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645 (1917). For discussion of an analogous problem see Blum,
Motive, Intent, and Purpose in FederalIncome Taxation, 34 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 485 (1967).

6. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). This opinion was written
by Judge Johnson and quoted in his article.
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of being violated7 Consequently, some violations of law are forms of protest,
not against the specific laws being violated, but rather against a complex of
social, cultural, and historical factors which have little if any direct connection
with the law being violated, and which are not readily apparent to the community observing the simple fact of violation. Carried still further, an
act of disobedience may express general resentment against the "establishment" as a whole, or may express frustration engendered in family or other
environments which are not even a part of the "establishment."
Another purpose behind acts of civil disobedience may be to embarrass
or weaken the machinery of organized society by concerted acts of disobedience. When large numbers of persons disobey the law the authorities may
have to choose between tolerating wholesale violations or crowding the jails
with violators ready and willing to spend their time "gumming up the works"
of society.
The repeated practice of massive disobedience (in common with repeated
massive activities which are within the law) may serve to organize a disciplined group which may become increasingly militant and pose an increasing
threat of violent revolution."
Of a less serious nature is the disobedience of an individual who is a
publicity-seeker, a masochist, or a victim of a psychic disorder.
Mention should again be made of the open violation of law by a person
who hopes, by bringing about an immediate change in the law, to be immune
from punishment. If the legal system rejects his plea for a change in the legal
norm, the system should, in determining the form and severity of his
punishment, give due regard to the purpose of his violation.
Proof of the purpose behind an act of civil disobedience may not always
be easy, especially when the actor himself may have only a vague sense of
irritation or frustration rather than a refined analytical view of specific
sociological problems.9 In cases where proof of purpose is impossible, the
legal system will be obliged to fall back on its traditional technique of
presuming one. However, where it is possible to prove the purpose of the
7. For example, an indigent citizen cannot possibly violate a law under which he is
allowed no free medical treatment; the law does not require him to do anything.
8. The substantial danger of open violence is documented by the chief of the FBI in
Hoover, Violence in American Society-A Problem of Critical Concern, 36 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 407 (1967). See also Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 205 (1966). While these authors do not prove conclusively that violence necessarily
follows as a result of the practice of civil disobedience (which they condemn as a "pernicious doctrine" and a "heresy," respectively), they raise matters which should be considered when inquiring into the purpose behind a violation of the law.
9. Although it might be desirable for everybody to act rationally, as suggested by
Allen, supra note I, at 12-13, modern science compels us to admit that, in fact, neither the
violator nor the official of the legal system can be expected to be perfectly rational. However, the official of the legal system, by virtue of his public responsibility and the resources and time available to him, may normally be expected to act more rationally than
the violator who is brought before him. See Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytical Jurisprudence: A
Common Language for Babylon, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1331 (1965); Falk, The Predicament of
Edmond Cahn, 8 How. L.J. 27 (1962); Marshall, Relation of the Unconscious to Intention,
52 VA. L. REV. 1256 (1966).
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disobedient, his purpose should be considered as a factor in determining the
punishment. Moreover, an inquiry into the purpose behind the act of disobedience may lead readily to an investigation of the underlying social
problems.
Punishment may be essential in order to preserve the peace. Yet if the
peace is uneasy and unjust, society should do more.
Unfortunately, acts of disobedience have sometimes been the only effective
means of bringing about overdue social reforms. Society may well be shamed
by being informed so rudely of its shortcomings, and by a species of backlash
may resist the suggestion that reforms be undertaken. But shame is an inadequate excuse for failure to carry out needed reform.
The act of civil disobedience challenges society to reconsider its institutions and values. It is obviously impossible to institute a sweeping examination of the entire society every time a person violates the law. But it is possible and highly desirable to conduct ongoing examinations of many aspects
of society, on a continuous basis, and to augment these studies from time to
time with special inquiries so as to cope with special trouble spots laid bare
by acts of civil disobedience.' 0 Such examinations need the services of technicians skilled in the various disciplines concerned with life in society, and
capable of rendering an impartial social accounting so that the makers of
political decisions may proceed from a basis of the most complete objective
information which can possibly be assembled."x Informed decision makers,
responsive to an informed public, will be in the best possible position to
justify the status quo when justification is called for, and, if the need for
reform is indicated, to take measures commensurate with the needs of society.

10.

To a great extent, of course, such examinations are made. A recent and significant

example is the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
11. The search for objective criteria with which to measure social problems and solutions is still in its early stages. Recent suggestive comments include: SOCIAL INDICATORS
(Bauer ed. 1966); Becker, The Fall and Rise of Political Scientific Jurisprudence: Its Relevance to Contemporary Legal Concerns, 45 N.C.L. Rlv. 642 (1967); Loevinger, Law and
Science as Rival Systems, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 530 (1966-1967); Miller, On the Need for
"Impact Analysis" of Supreme Court Decisions, 53 GEo. L.J. 365 (1965); Schwartz &
Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 274 (1967); Shuman, Book Review, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1442 (1966). A bill introduced recently in the United States Senate proposed the creation of a Council of Social Advisers to the President, with broad responsibility for gathering and interpreting information concerning social affairs, and for preparing reports and recommendations. S. 843, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., §4 (1967), introducing
the FuLL OPPORTUNITY AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTING Acr.
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